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Address by Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
to the USNA Class of 1947
Thursday, 13 November 1980

It seemed appropriate to describe to you how one of your own friends and classmates can change your life. It all started for me on the 2nd of February 1977; I was sitting peacefully in my office in Naples minding my military naval business over there. The phone rang and it was the new Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, whom I did not know. He said, "the President would like to see you tomorrow in Washington." I said that is nice. He said, "I can't tell you what it is all about." So, I hung up the phone, called in my aide and said would you get me on the next plane to Washington. I then asked the Chief of Staff and my closest advisors to come and and said, "Troops, the boss sent for me tomorrow; I don't know what it is about, but let's war game this thing--I don't know if I am being called in for an interview to see how I stack up with other people; let's see what should my answers be, if he is going to tell me to do something--in which case what should my answers be, etc."

We went through various military possibilities--the Chief of Staff said well, you know Sorenson just flunked the course for CIA--I said, oh my God, what do I say if he offers that to me. The Chief of Staff looked back at me and said, "Stan, he wouldn't do that to you." We skipped the answer to that question and war gamed the rest of it. The aide came running back in and said if we work hard we can just catch the Concorde out of Paris tonight and but of course it^{is} against all the government rules to take a foreign airlines. I said, Butch, no President has ever sent for me before--let's go first class. Some of you may know a fellow out of '43 named Dave Bagley; he had just arrived in Naples in a Navy jet; my aide commandeered his jet, flew us to Paris, walked on board the Concorde the minute they opened the door and I arrived here at Dulles Airport 8 hours and 45 minutes from talking to Harold Brown.

I got up the next morning and went to see Harold Brown; I got an appointment with him but I was a little concerned because I noticed the appointment they gave me was 30 minutes before I was due in the Oval Office; trying to get across the river and all that and then maybe 10 or 15 minutes with Harold Brown, whom I did not know. As I walked in to see him, he said sir it is nice to meet you but the President has got something he wants to ask you to do and he'll tell you about it. I said oh, okay. I'm pretty thick at times, but as I got in the car going across the river I said to myself--you know, if the Secretary of Defense, whom I don't know, doesn't want to meet me and get to know me, you know, I'm not going to a military assignment. So, I thought about the Chief of Staff's remarks and I had about ten minutes to conjure up what my answer would be.

Well, I walked into the Oval Office; here was our classmate, very, very warm and friendly, and ah, I don't know, well, I... He has remained a very warm and friendly person throughout the tremendous responsibility given him these last four years; but he was very warm to me and took me into his private office with the Vice President; sat down and all of a sudden I found myself pretty dazzled, as a matter of fact, but I was being lectured by the President of the United States about what a great guy I was and at the end of it came the CIA punchline. Well, I looked back at him and said, "Mr. President, if I really do have the capabilities and qualities you have been so generous describing, I could do you a lot more good in the military because you need those certain qualities there--I'd like to stay where I am. Well, it really was an interesting experience in retrospect but I just sat there and I kept hearing him say, CIA. I was sort of dazed, you know, but all I could tell that was coming through that he wasn't changing his mind. I finally said to myself, this next two or three minutes is the last chance you have to drive any kind of a bargain in

this deal. He said, you know I want you to run the whole intelligence community, not just the CIA--that's what your job is. So I finally said Mr. President I don't think there is enough authority for anybody to run the intelligence community. I didn't know beans about the job of intelligence. He said well, you're in charge of the budget committee for intelligence. I said, Mr. President, being in charge of a committee in this city gets you absolutely nowhere. Six months later I had charge of the budget.

I walked out in a real daze because I could sort of see those thirty-some years of naval career just sort of going across the screen there but that just wasn't going to use them, build on them, but you know, each of us in our own walk of life, those of you in the Navy, etc., you develop a concept of ambitions, desires, what you want to do for the organization, company or whatever it is. I, of course, had those up the kazoo, and I'd come on that airplane thinking about what I was going to tell the boss I would do when I got the chance. But now I saw all that going down the drain and some new challenge coming up.

Well, what does it mean. What's it been like? What did our classmate throw me into? I think the first thing that strikes me in retrospect is the depth of antagonism toward CIA that I found in the country, the media of course, at that time and it really did take me by surprise, clearly. I knew CIA wasn't popular, but the degree of animosity, the degree of irrationality total inability to get the press to understand/^{what}the absolute necessity of the kinds of secret activities we have to do was quite a change from the--you know we were pilloried in the military for a while during Vietnam, but really nothing ^{this} of/took on and meant that I felt a great responsibility and made a great effort, and frankly, tried to put my own personal reputation on the line to rehabilitate

the Agency's name and reputation, because it really was important for the country.

A second characteristic of what I found was that the CIA is very like the Navy; very like the military. It's most responsive.. A little anecdote. You know when you out to a public place to speak and you have the podium. Some are high, some are low and I like to be able to look at my notes without having to spend time looking down. So I asked the Agency one time-- I said look fellows, I want a little gadget, sort of like a moveable parallelogram-- you know those things we used with our navigation--so that I can get up to the podium and I can slide my paper up as high as I can get it--you see what I mean. Just build me a little something. In two weeks I had a kit. I couldn't even carry it. It was machine-tooled. I never even used it. It was so complex the point will put that paper anywhere you want. I stopped asking for many things after that. But they really are responsive; they're dedicated. And I would say they are at the Agency, the ^{single} most talented group of public servants in our country. I really think man-for-man, woman-for-woman, they have really got quality of people there, It's wonderful in that respect to work with them.

But, I'd found our classmate had thrown me into something that was quite different than the Navy. CIA had grown. It's a very young organization--it had grown out of the OSS and it really was disorganized. It didn't have a management sense. It was running the fifty-yard dash, only now we were working on a long distance run. We were old enough and we had to be able to do the long distance and we hadn't prepared the management foundations for a continuing operation. We were living off the fat of super people who had come in in the past and we didn't have a personnel management system that was sure we brought in the right, best young talent at the bottom; then we challenge them adequately

adapted to the morays of the youth today who want to be challenged differently than you and I wanted to be challenged in '46 and ensure that everybody in the Agency thought he had an opportunity to use his talents; and we've done a great deal in the last three and a half years. The great help I've had from the wonderful deputy I was lucky to get, Frank Carlucci, former Ambassador and and former Deputy at HEW, and we've instituted a much more systematic, centralized personnel management system.

The other big difference, but not entirely difference from the Navy, was CIA has been three, very decentralized operations. We have the spy department, we have human spies, we have a technical spy department with satellites, photographs, signals, other equipment, the kind of places that invented the U-2 and then we have an analytic department that tries to take a product from all these and bring it together. But, because of the inherent and the importance of secrecy in an organization like this, particularly in the human spy department, there was very little communication between these three and you can't really tolerate that today. You can't go out because you're a spy and get something at great risk that you could get with a photograph. You've got to be working together, talking together. You can't have analysts wanting to know what the grain harvest in Poland is going to be this year when the grain harvest people are analyzing what it's going to be in the Ukraine. I'm just trying to make things up, but you've got to really be tied together and the decentralization was worse from the Navy's submarines, aviation and destroyers, much worse. And that's a fact. But we've worked a lot on trying to bring the management together. I deal with the subordinates there as a corporation now. I deal with them as the top of these departments and a couple of others who are

managers as a team, as a committee, as a group. (Inaudible)...I'm making the decisions but it used to be they were dealt with individually by the Director and things were isolated from each other. And if the Agency made mistakes, and it did make some mistakes--not nearly as many (inaudible), it was not because people were dumb or foolish, or malicious, it was because it was so compartmented that a fellow who was overzealous did more than he could legally do, or should have done, to get away with it because there wasn't enough check and balance. You can certainly go too far in the other direction because if you proliferate this very sensitive information too far, obviously you're going to have leaks and problems. So we're trying to find that compromise between a corporate decisionmaking structure, with some compartmentation within it--they don't all need to know everything that we are doing in the innermost detail, but enough so we get a check and a balance on each other. So we've made a lot of progress there and it's been an interesting challenge.

I mentioned that the President asked me to run the Community--which is statutorily and had been since 1947, a second job for the head of the CIA. Entirely separate, to bring together the Defense Intelligence, the State Department intelligence, the National Security Agency and so on. Boy I tell you, when the boss threw me into this one, I was a buzz saw. First of all, he said, "Now take charge of this place." Well, a few Directors had tried it a little bit, but not very much and a few Presidents had walked right up to the brink of giving the Director more authority. Jimmy walked up to the brink and he gave me the budget authority I mentioned and gave me one additional authority over what we call tasking--telling the people who collect intelligence what they are to collect on and what their priorities are. But he didn't go all the way and give me the full authorities you really would have to have to run it

like you'd run a ship. And trying to ease some of that authority and power away from the barons who run these other organizations is no easy task. Now, on top of that, look at the position that I'm in. If I'm going to get the Agency, the CIA running loyally and enthusiastically behind me I've got to be their advocate out in front. If I'm going to run the Community and get all those barons to cooperate and work under my direction as a team, I've got to be seen not to be an advocate of the CIA. So, it is a far different situation than being in the military in this respect where you have broader, cleaner lines of command. I don't want to overstate that because there are a lot of problems and contradictions there, too, but I think this is a very difficult and unusual situation where you try to be things to two different constituencies at the same time when there is so much conflict between them. I am pleased, however, because there is good will in all these organizations and I don't want to overstate the degree of distance and problems, but there has been real progress in bringing our Community together and there is a large climate of opinion within the Community that we need to work together better and I think a lot of progress has been made in that direction. But, all I'm saying is when our classmate picked me up and threw me into this pool of alligators, I didn't quite appreciate these problems of public antagonism and the need to restructure the Central Intelligence Agency for the long haul in terms of its management procedures and the difficulty in playing both of the roles that he gave me.

Let me wind up by saying that I'll be eternally grateful to him for having put this confidence in me and having supported me thoroughly during the four years and for having let me have this opportunity to serve the country with expanded horizons with a whole different perspective that I never would have

had if I had stayed in the Navy. I miss the Navy; I regret not being able to complete some of the things I had hoped to have completed there, but this has been as challenging, exciting and rewarding as anybody could possibly ask for and I am grateful to Jimmy Carter for making it available and for his leadership during these four years. It will go down of course, the Presidency, to be judged by history and all of us have different opinions of it today. Let me assure you that I have watched him first-hand, watched him very closely and the one thing that you ought to give him real credit for is that he is an honest and upright and dedicated a man as anyone knows. He has tackled tough ones; hasn't won them all; in retrospect people will say Jimmy Carter shouldn't have tackled this or that and should have tackled another one, but he sure has given it a try. We can be proud of him and proud of our class and let's look to Jerry to carry the flag on in the future.

GT November 1980

USNA Class of 1947
Washington, D.C.
Noon, Thursday, 13 November 1980

-- Personal greeting

-- We are all witnessing today one of the marvels of the democratic process-- the orderly transition of power from one Administration to the next. It is being done smoothly, and with the genuine desire to serve the country well.

-- The intelligence community, like the military and the other continuing institutions of our government provide the stability and continuity which makes that kind of a transition possible.

-- While the Administration's approach may change, the issues and challenges facing us in the world will be much the same for the Reagan Administration as they have been in the Carter Administration.

-- And so, today I would like to talk a little about the challenges which our intelligence services must face in the decade ahead.

I believe the decade of the 1980s will be more precarious for this country than we have faced in recent history. / First, because in the '80s, we will face for the first time a Soviet leadership that does not feel militarily inferior to the United States. / Whether that Soviet perception is grounded in fact or fiction, there is very little that even the Congress or the Pentagon can do to change it significantly in the better part of the decade ahead of us. / Consequently, our foreign policy must be based on the perception by the Soviets of military parity with us. Essentially, that means that our relationship with the Soviet Union must be handled differently than in the past. It is a new challenge to us.

Second, the free countries of the developed world cannot expect the same continued high rate of economic growth we have become accustomed to. Traditionally, economic growth in developed countries has been tied to the growth rate of the energy supply. We in the Central Intelligence Agency believe that the developed countries of the Free World will be lucky if they sustain a growth increase in the total energy supply--natural gas, oil, coal, nuclear, thermal, solar, whatever it may be--of 1 or 2% for the better part of this decade. And that may be optimistic. Thus, the rate of energy increase will not sustain gross national product growth rates of 4, 5 or 6%.

Beyond that, we forecast that in 1980 the OPEC countries will cream \$120 billion off the top of international trade. That may not seem like a great deal until you compare it to the 1978 figure which was just \$2 billion. When OPEC increased the price of oil 3 1/2 times in 1974, the OPEC countries generated an enormous cash surplus. But by 1978 two things wore that surplus down to \$2 billion by two devices. One, they bought more from us. And, two, inflation adversely affected them as it has us. Their cash surplus has now risen to \$110 billion because within the last 18 months the price of oil has gone up more than 125%. There are clear signs that OPEC is not going to let us eat their surplus away by inflation in the future. We have a different challenge ahead of us.

Thirdly, in the 1980s the mechanisms for handling military, political, and economic problems will work differently. Our NATO and Japanese allies have sound political structures. They are prosperous economically. They clearly want a larger voice in the councils of our alliances. Additionally, the lesser developed, raw material producing countries will be much more intent in the '80s on producing what is in their best economic interests rather than ours. This

does not mean that our alliances need weaken nor that there need be strained relations with the lesser developed countries. Instead, it means that we will have to be more astute and more foresighted. To do that we will need better information, better intelligence upon which to base foreign policy decisions.

Can we have better intelligence, which often must be obtained and kept ~~secret~~ *secret* that ~~we~~, without infringing upon the rights assured us all in the Constitution? I believe so. But it will require changes in the way the intelligence community does its business and, beyond that, it will require new legislative support to enable us to function effectively yet guarantee all Constitutional provisions are respected.

Let me start by describing a few of the changes we have already made in how we do our business. We are scrupulous today in avoiding any activity which might intrude on the privacy of an American, ~~or which may confuse intelligence gathering with law enforcement.~~ While this can be a ~~severe~~ *severe* constraint on obtaining foreign intelligence, I believe we can live with it. For example, if we are tracing flow of narcotics in a foreign country, and a foreign narcotics trafficker becomes involved with an American, either illegally or legally, we must drop the case.

An actual case a short time ago occurred during a rebellion in a lesser developed country. We were having considerable difficulty keeping track of what was happening. The best information came from ham radio transmissions of an American missionary in the country. The question we had to answer before monitoring was "Does this qualify as illegal electronic surveillance of an American citizen?" Our lawyers debated the points of law and decided that as long as the missionary was using a ham radio band and method of transmission,

which in essence is public / it would be legal to listen. / But, if he shifted his technique or his frequency / in an effort to disguise his broadcast / -as he well might given the risk under which he was operating / -then we would have to consider that a desire for privacy / and we would have to stop listening. /

My legal staff and the Attorney General's / very often must consider fundamental issues of law like this / in the midst of operational crises. / The Attorney General's people have been very cooperative with us / in resolving these issues quickly / nonetheless, the obvious result of these kinds of constraints / is that the speed and flexibility / of our response to crises is reduced. / You can also imagine the dampening effect it can have on all intelligence work. / Today our people in the field are almost forced to drop any operation which could involve an American citizen.

In most instances, we can adapt reasonably well. / However, because the issues are often complex / and because my people in the field are generally not lawyers, / it can induce over-caution by the individual on-scene. / The more complex the legal standards / with which intelligence officers must comply, / the more the chance is that their initiative will be dulled / and the more their flexibility in crisis situations / which might involve the lives or the property of American citizens is reduced. /

I personally feel that the costs of insuring the rights / of the American citizen / under the Constitution / are bearable and are worth it to us as a nation. / There is, however, another cost, / a cost that has arisen out of the intense public focus of recent years on the intelligence process. / This is the cost which comes from the reduction / in our ability to guard national secrets. / *which is not worth it* *is* *is a cost which is neither bearable nor worth it to our country.*

Today, there is talk about unleashing the CIA. / Unleashing is not what we need, not what we want, / not what the Congress will do. / What we do seek, because our effectiveness depends upon it, / is to be able to protect legitimate secrets better; / secrets about how we collect information; / who our sources are; / and what the information actually is. / In four specific areas, we have needed legislative help. / Some has been received, but ~~that is only a beginning~~. *Because* Unfortunately, much of the media reporting on this legislation has misunderstood its intent. / I would like to take a minute on each to describe what we are seeking and why. /

The first concerns covert action. / Just in the past few months important legislation has been passed / which will protect this nation's covert action capability. / As you know, covert action is not really an intelligence function. / It is any effort by the United States to influence the course of events / in a foreign country without the origin of that influence being identifiable. / Covert action is a dirty word to some, / and less than three years ago some people / were trying to legislate covert action out of existence. / In recent months, the American public and the press have asked more and more "Isn't there something we can do to exert our power, / our influence, overseas short of sending the military?" / Yes, there is. / We can try to influence events peacefully / behind the scenes through covert action. / Covert action has limitations, / but it does have a proper place in our diplomatic portfolio / between talking and fighting. /

In 1974, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment / which required that each time the President approved a covert action, / I had to notify up to eight committees of the Congress. / I assure you it is very difficult to recruit volunteers / to undertake a high risk covert operation / if I have to admit to them that I am

going up on Capitol Hill to tell 200 people about it. / That is not to say the Congress is not trustworthy. / I do not want to tell 200 people at the CIA about it either / if they do not really need to know about it. /

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment in 1974 was an understandable effort by Congress / to tighten controls on this activity. / That may have been necessary and desirable at that time, / but since then a rigorous set of oversight procedures / has been instituted in the executive and congressional branches / which adequately controls covert action. / Two committees of the Congress are dedicated exclusively to intelligence oversight. / The legislative relief which we sought and received / reduced notification of covert actions from eight / to those two intelligence oversight committees. / This still ensures effective accountability, / and, in ~~the~~ fact, not even reduces substantially the number of committees that know because on the two intelligence committees are representatives of the other six committees. / So if there is a legitimate jurisdictional need to know about a covert action, there will be members on their committees who can so inform them. / This is an important step in bringing covert action back into the realm of the feasible / while clearly providing for its responsible use through accountability. /

The second area ⁴⁰²⁰ where we still need relief / is from the Freedom of Information Act. / The problem here is more one of perception than of fact. / Our foreign sources / and the foreign intelligence agencies with whom we cooperate / are not persuaded today / that their identities and the information they give us / can be kept secret / under the Freedom of Information Act requirement. /

In fact, it can. / Under existing law, we are not required to release information about our sources. / But that protection is continually being challenged

in the courts. / Our agents wonder how much longer / we will win those cases. / As long as they perceive that there is a risk to them / from the Freedom of Information Act, our operations will be hampered. /

Again, we don't want a blanket exemption. / We are asking for an exemption only for information / which identifies our sources / so that we can assure those sources that they are specifically exempt. / While this need to protect sources / is an area of intelligence work / that should be better understood by the media than by others, / they have chosen to regard themselves as the only profession with sources to protect. /

The third area is of very serious personal concern to me. / It is unreasonable, in my opinion, / to ask Americans to work for the CIA abroad, / especially in the lawless climate that exists today, / where our people's lives are frequently on the line / by the very nature of the work that they do, / if we cannot at least protect their identities from our enemies. /

Yet today people like Philip Agee, / whose avowed purpose is to destroy the Central Intelligence Agency, / can deliberately and callously disclose the identities / of American intelligence officers and our sources with impunity. / Richard Welch, our chief of station in Athens, was murdered in 1975 / shortly after his identity was disclosed. / This past summer one of Agee's cohorts, Louis Wolf, / went on television in Jamaica, / showed the pictures of 15 employees of the American Embassy, gave their names, / their telephone numbers, their addresses and their license plate numbers. / Two nights later the home of one of them was bombed and machine-gunned. / Two nights after that there was an abortive attack on another. /

It makes no sense to call for better intelligence / and then not provide elemental protection / to those who collect that intelligence. / The officer and

his family become the object of terrorism, his career is destroyed, and the nation loses the substantial investment it has made in the individual. The replacement of compromised officers often takes years and sometimes is impossible.

Beyond that, once an officer's identity is disclosed, our adversaries can then analyze his past associations and his places of employment, unravelling a wide web of past associates, sources, and others who helped the United States, often at great personal risk.

The history of proposed legislation to correct this situation has been controversial and will continue to be so. The debate in the Senate has raged from one extreme to the other. Early in the game, one senator said it was just not possible to punish private citizens who had no direct or authorized access to this classified information that was being disclosed. Another said, "It is not possible to have an ongoing intelligence capability and a totality of civil rights protection."

The consensus legislation that is now drafted is *a good compromise* in between. It is very narrow so as not to infringe upon the freedom of speech. It would first apply to those who have had authorized access to classified information and then disclose it. But it would also apply to anyone who discloses protected intelligence identities if he or she does so as part of a deliberate effort to impair or impede our foreign intelligence activities.

Lastly, important legislation has just been passed to prevent "gray mail." Gray mail is when a defendant demands that the government produce all manner of perhaps irrelevant classified information in the course of a prosecution in the hope of dissuading prosecution. Unfortunately, there have been cases when such disclosure would have damaged the United States more than would have been a withdrawal of the prosecution, and we have had to withdraw.

The gray mail legislation will enable the government to prevent the unnecessary disclosure of classified information through pre-trial rulings and other means.

Let me sum up by saying that any intelligence function in this country will always be the cause of a dilemma. On the one hand, we are striving for an ideal: an open society where government processes are as open as possible. On the other, every responsible American recognizes the necessity for an essentially secret intelligence service to prevent our country from being surprised or threatened. Can the ideal and the necessity coexist?

I believe they can. I believe they must. The issue is not the leashing or unleashing of the Central Intelligence Agency. The issue is whether we can equip our intelligence agencies with both the legal and the practical tools to do an effective job in a changing world and, at the same time, require them to adhere to the legal and ethical standards on which our country was built.

I believe we can do both. Rigorous oversight procedures instituted in both the executive and congressional branches over the past three years have given Americans reason to be confident that their intelligence activities are in consonance with national policy and accountable to the people through their elected representatives. At the same time, with the growing understanding and support of the American public, and with the passage of the legal remedies I have described, we will continue to be the most effective intelligence service in the world.

We are moving surely, steadily in the right direction. But we all must continue to support a strong intelligence capability so that we can learn about and interpret events in other countries. We will very much need to be able to do that throughout the precarious decade that lies ahead.

Thank you very much.

Luncheon Address/USNA Class of 1947
Thursday, 13 November 1980

Feb 2, 1977

Clean living

What find

Depth antagonism

Rehabilitate

Similar Navy

Responsive - dedicated

Capable - talent

Disorganized

Personnel management

No Division Officers

Decentralized control

Subs - air - DD's

DCI Role

Not attempted before - J.C.

Baronies - power loss



Conflict of constituencies

Success in Agency - advocacy

Success in Community - divorce from Agency

Top - Experiment - democracy - secrecy

Secrecy



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